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Sugar growers continue to benefit from favorable economic conditions
provided by the U.S. government. Yet empirical data reveal a decrease in
tile aggregate support for sugar legislation in recent years. In 1978, there
were 9,187 full or part owners of sugar cane and sugar beet farms, compared
to 7,799 farms in 1987. The level of sugar subsidy allocated to the farmers,
however, has increased and even favored certain sugar growers
disproportionately over others. Such empirical findings suggests that politics,
as much as economics, affect the level of sugar subsidy. This paper examines
why an increasingly smaller number of sugar farmers receive a steadily larger
government subsidy.
Mainstream economics cannot explain the unusual linkage between sugar
producers and subsidy levels. While traditional, neoclassical economists
cultivate elegant models that explain economic phenomena, they fail to
characterize correctly the relationship between voters, their elected
representatives, and the political institutions which shape the policies.
Consequently, an accurate model must combine what we know from
mainstream economics and political economy. Before outlining the theoretical
framework, however, the following section reviews the history of the sugar
subsidy.
History of Sugar Subsidy
The Jones-Costigan Act, created the modern sugar program as part of
the New Deal package of agricultural legislation in 1934. The program
included domestic production controls and direct payments to farmers, as
well as import restrictions that addressed the declining ratio of farm to non-
farm incomes of the preceding decade (Harper, 1990). The first major
transformation of the U.S. sugar program resulted from the U.S. trade embargo
of Cuba's exports to the U.S. in 1963. Throughout the following years, the
United States government imposed a series of price supports, import quotas,
and loans to protect U.S. producers from lower-priced foreign grown sugar
as well as to encourage domestic production of sugar (Rendelman, 1989).
Many farmers in the U.S. began to supplement the dearth of sugar left by the
embargo and exploit the "protected market" conditions provided by the U.S.
government subsidy.
Despite the federal aid granted to sugar growers, not all sectors of
agriculture devoted to growing sugar derivatives flourished. Domestic
production of sugar cane increased steadily from 1982 onward, while sugar
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beet production stagnated (Knutson, 1985). Through time, the largest number
of sugar beet farmers were concentrated in a specific West/Midwest region
of the U.S. (Minnesota, North Dakota, Idaho) while sugar cane farmers
were found in the Southeast, specifically Louisiana and Florida. Farmers in
a majority of states, then, did not receive positive economic or political
incentives from the sugar subsidy.
Perhaps more important, the number of farmers who received a subsidy
for sugar cane and sugar beet derivatives decreased over time, while the
level of subsidy increased. By 1995, the program peaked at over $500 million
dollars in loans to U.S. sugar growers. The welfare cost to consumers has
also increased over the years to over $1.9 billion dollars. Corn, the derivative
of high fructose com syrup, emerged as a strong competitor in the domestic
sweetener market. While sugar held 72% of the domestic sweetener market
in 1975, that share had fallen to 40% by 1987, suggesting that the number of
farmers who could vote to support sugar legislation (Le. the political clout of
sugar growers) had significantly diminished (Harper, 1988).
Ironically, producer of such alternative sweeteners can increase the prices
of their products according to the protected market price for sugar, resulting
in high profit margins (Irving, 1988). Hence the producers of high fructose
corn syrup have become active supporters of the sugar program (Monahan,
1992).
In order to prevent excess domestic sugar from being dumped onto the
world market at an economic loss to sugar growers, representatives of sugar
refineries and constituencies that benefit from the sugar program have
vigorously lobbied theAgriculture Committee of the House of Representatives
to maintain a high domestic price support (see Graph 1). Since the current
sugar program began in 1981, the sugar industry has contributed more than
$11 million to campaigns of selected politicians in order to maintain the
economic benefits of the sugar program (Chicago Tribune, 1995: 30 April).
Despite the efforts of the sugar industry to maintain the level of sugar
subsidy, the rising budget deficit is forcing the Republican-led Congress to
reassess its support of a number of the major agricultural programs.
Representative Dan Miller (R-Fl.) vowed to kill the federal sugar subsidy
program that provides a $1.9 billion annual windfall to U.S. sugar growers
(Regan, 1995).
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Concerned taxpayers and manufacturers who demand sugar for
consumption and production purposes are pressing the U.S. government to
end the subsidy program for sugar growers and force them to join the
competitive ranks of the world market. These groups who generate a demand
for sugar feel the economic brunt of the sugar subsidies in a substantive way.
They are shut out from the inexpensive world market price of sugar and
instead find their tax dollars funding the price supports and interest free
loans which guarantee the profit of sugar growers. Consumers are left to buy
.U.S. sugar at a price greater than fifty percentof world market prices, spurring
politicians such as House Majority Leader Richard Armey (R-Tex.) to declare
that the sugar program was "the most costly cartel to American consumers
since OPEC' (Regan, 1995).
Literature Review
Public Choice theory concentrates on translating voter preferences into
policy choice. A majority of their scholarly work rests on the utility-
maximizing, rational actor, who, by assumption, makes all decisions for policy
outcomes on the basis of a range of idealized properties. These properties
include perfect knowledge, stable goals, and zero transaction costsI (Moe
1985). With such favorable conditions, policy outcome is simply a "black
box that produces optimal choices automatically as a function of any given
environment" (Moe, 1985).
A number of economists who were puzzled by the failure of regulatory
and tariff policies to validate the normative economic theory attempted to
explain the deviations through rational choice models of the legislative
process. These economic theories "had treated policymakers as largely inert
public interest maximizers who would faithfully implement the economists'
canons" (Hayes. 1981). Public Choice scholar Mueller (1979: 3) attempts to
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define the detenninants and theoretical motivations of policy choice within
different political systems (federal, state, and local).
The public choice approach to non-market decision making has been
... to make the same behavioral assumptions as general economics
(rational, utilitarian man), often to depict the preference revelation
process as analogous to the market (voters engage in exchange, via
... reveal[ing] their demand schedules....
But such a framework assumes "rational" decisions are made in a frictionless
universe.
Moreover, many economists argue that the weakness of rational choice
theory lies in its failure to enhance the general knowledge of how human
nature and organization interact under political constructs (Shapiro and Green,
1994). Consequently, when many rational choice models are subjected to
empirical testing, their validity is often called into question. Ironically,
Mueller and others defend public choice theory because "the use of the
simplified models of political behavior is justified so long as they outperform
the competitors in explaining political behavior" (Mueller, 1979). Downs
(1957), for example, argued tllat in a more realistic tlleory of the policy
process policymakers, like finns and consumers, would be viewed as self-
interest maximizers.
This paper argues that the public choice literature often ignores the
independent impact of political institutions on policy choice. In order to
find economic theories that incorporate the effect of political institutions on
economic perfonnance, one must turn to literature concentrated in political
economy. Douglass North (1992) introduces the autonomous nature of
political systems into the neoclassical economic paradigm through his analysis
of institutions and tlleir role in detennining policy choice. Political scientists
recognize that North's "transaction-cost analysis is a decided extension of
the view of politics as merely a series of exchange of benefits" (Browne,
1995). Unlike previous economic theories that suggest institutions are solely
designed to achieve efficient outcomes and play no independent role in
economic perfonnance, North argues that institutions provide the structure
for exchange which in tum detennines the cost of political and economic
excbange.
Theoretical Framework
Institutions directly impact economic outcomes, such as subsidy
payments over time by altering the costs of political exchange between voters
and representatives. Empirical evidence tends to support North's theory;
Congress bas continued to support a policy that benefits a small group of
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fanners at the expense of so many because they are influenced by the political
system and the relative power of interest groups (Sturgiss, 1990).
These interest groups, such as the political action committees (PACS)
continuously lobby legislators and the Executive Branch to influence sugar
policy making (Sturgiss, 1990). Accordingly, the more money PACs
contribute to congressional campaigns, the greater the amount of subsidy
allocated to sugar growers. PACs, however, are not alone in influencing
sugar policy making.
The power of congressional committees in the U.S. political system
allows sugar interests to influence policy making by developing relationships
with only a few key legislators (Monahan, 1992). In order to account for the
level of sugar subsidy, as Monahan suggests, it is important to note what
legislators come from sugar producing states and how many sit or chair the
salient committees in Congress. Politicians who serve on the agriculture
committee and represent areas with a level of sugar production would be
expected to increase the level of sugar subsidy granted to domestic growers.
Institutions are not necessarily created to be socially efficient, but are
created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to devise
new rules. Whereas a strict neoclassical view of economics asserts that
institutions induce the actors to acquire the essential information that will
lead to "efficient policy choices," North argues that individuals will often
act on incomplete information due to the cost of accurately measuring the
worth of the good, services, or performance of an agent and will instead use
subjectively derived models that are frequently erroneous.
In the case of the sugar subsidy, political institutions provide a bartering
system where voter preferences are distorted by a number of groups or
institutions. Other political scientists, such as Barry Weingast, corroborate
North's theory through their research. Weingast found that legislators act in
their own self-interest by establishing norms and forming institutions which
further their goals although they may not meet any economic costlbenefil
criteria (Weingast, 1979).
One norm under which legislators often operate is party identification.
Since 1965, a Democratic House supported the development of the current
sugar subsidy program. As the number of Democratic senators and
representatives declined over time, it is important to test what, if any, effect
this political shift has had on the level of sugar subsidy over time. Democrats
have traditionally supported a more liberal approach to government influence
in economic market systems. Because of this, it is expected that as the
number of Democrats decrease in either chamber, the level of sugar subsidy
would decrease.
When attempting to gauge the effect of political variables upon the level
of sugar subsidy, it is important to realize that political institutions, as North
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suggests, are operated through formal constraints.' Formal constraints include
political and economic rules and contracts and define the hierarchical structure
of Lhe polity, its basic decision structure and Lhe explicit characteristics of
agenda control. Formal constraints are the driving force behind Lhe creation
of policy. For instance, there are a myriad of subcommittees, committees,
and votes in boLh houses that a policy such as Lhe sugar subsidy must go
Lhrough before it can be implemented on a large scale. This would also lead
to the assumption that party identification would also impact Lhe level of
sugar subsidy granted to farmers.
The level of import quotas and domestic price supports have negatively
impacted Lhe sugar market. Scholars have found that U.S. sugar policy
consistently undermines the U.S. foreign policy goal of assistingThird World
economic development. Yearly decreases in U.S. sugar imports contributed
to Lhe collapse of sugar industries of the poorest countries in the world
(Sturgiss, 1990). In tracking the level of sugar subsidies granted to farmers,
it is important to monitor the amount of sugar production by foreign markets.
Moreover, Lhis decline in import quota levels indirectly warrants increasing
price supports for domestic sugar growers who must supply the U.S. with
sugar (see Graph 2).
Graph 2
Sugar Import Quotas 1965-19927000,.--=--.::----------------1
This graph shows the direct effect of Congress' initiatives to protect the
domestic sugar market. The level of sugar allowed into the United States
peaked in 1977 at 6,138,000 short tons and has steadily decreased to a low of
1,200,000 short tons in 1989.
Empirical data also reveals that Lhe U.S. is an inefficient and high cost
sugar producer when compared to manyThirdWorld sugar exporting countries
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(lves, 1988). Although U.S. growers claim that their industry is one of the
most efficient in the world because of its high yields per acre, the U.S. falls
near the middle in international cost comparison rankings (Landell Mills,
1990). From this chain of events, it can be construed that the level of sugar
subsidy granted to domestic producers is causally linked to the viability of
foreign sugar production. Conversely, the international price of sugar would
also be affected by economic protectionism of the U.S. sugar market. As the
world price increases, the level of sugar subsidy would decrease because
there would be a greater economic incentive to utilize domestic sugar and
the need for artificial supports would be minimal.
In an attempt to reconcile such damaging effects on the foreign sugar
industry, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives in March
1989 that would have provided a minimum floor on import quotas for
countries within the Caribbean basin. The Bush administration, however.
declared the bill's preferential nature to the Caribbean inconsistent with U.S.
trade philosophy. The bill lost momentum and ultimately failed (Monahan.
1992),
This paper will also test how the level of domestic sugar production
compares with total domestic agricultural production (see Graph 3).
Graph 3
Ratio of Sugar Production to
Total Agriculture Production
1965-1992
NIl _
NIl__
Using basic supply and demand theory, if the ratio between domesiic
sugar production and total domestic agricultural production ofsugar increases.
the level of subsidies would decrease due to the already established high
demand for sugar in the United States. Consequently, there would be less
incentive for the government to create artificial supports for a commodity
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that is selling well on its own. As Graph 3 shows, the ratio has remained
consistent over time.
There are other important economic variables to test in this research
model. As Americans have decreased their consumption of sugar since the
19605, one would expect the level of subsidies to increase in order to offset
a lower equilibrium price due to the lack of domestic demand for sugar.
Hypotheses
This paper will test the impact of the following economic and political
variables upon the level of sugar loans allocated to sugar farmers. This study
posits the following hypotheses.
Consumption of Sugar (CONSUME) Hypothesis: •
As the amount of sugar consumed increases, the amount of loans granted
to sugar growers decreases due to the increased consumer demand for sugar.
Ratio of domestic sugar production
to total agricultural production (RTSGPAGP) Hypothesis:-
If this ratio increases, the amount of sugar loans will decrease because of
the increased consumer demand for sugar.
Ratio of domestic sugar production
to total world sugar production (WORLD) Hypothesis: •
If this ratio increases, the amount of sugar loans will decrease
because of the increased demand for domestic sugar on the world market
International Price of Sugar (INT.$SUG) Hypothesis: •
As the world price increases, the level of loans will decrease because of
the decrease in price differential between U.S. sugar and world sugar prices.
Number of Senate Agricultural
committee members that are from
sugar producing states (SENCOMM) Hypothesis: +
As the number of senate members from sugar producing states increases,
the level of loans will increase because they want to meet the financial
requests of their constituents.
Number of House Agricultural
committee members that are from
sugar producing states (HOSCOMM) Hypothesis: +
As the number of house members from sugar producing states increases,
the level of loans will increase because they want to meet the financial
requests of their constituents.
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Number of Democrats in Senate (NUMDEMS) Hypothesis: +
As the number of Democrats in the senate increase, the amount of loans
will increase because they advocate government support of farm programs.
Number of Democrats in House (NUMDEMH) Hypothesis: +
As the number of Democrats in the house increase, the amount of loans
will increase because they advocate government support of farm programs.
Results
The data presented in these models were collected from a combination
of sources. All of the political variables tested (number of Democrats in the
House and Senate, the number ofagricultural committee members from sugar
producing states) were gathered from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac
through 1965 to 1992. World sugar production data came from the United
Nations Statistical Tables 1992. Data regarding the number of sugar beet
and sugar cane farms came from selected volumes of the U.S. Agriculture
Census, 1978-1987. The remaining economic indicators were found in the
United States StatisticalAbstractsjrom 1965-1992. Lobby data was obtained
from the Federal Election Commission files covering the years of 1977-1992.
Sugar loans
The independent variables listed in the on the following page are tested
against one of the dependent variables that comprise the sugar subsidy;
specifically government loans to sugar producers. The level of loans granted
to sugar growers varies significantly between 1965-1992. In order to gain a
better sense of the findings, the economic variables that are tested against
the amount of loans are presented first, then followed by the regression results
which incorporate the political variables. Both models present reported
significance levels. The t-statistics follow and are presented in parentheses.
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Modell
u.s. Loans to Sugar
Growers Against Selected
Economic Variables
INT.$SUg .1107
(-1.688)
RTSGPAGP .8070
(-.248)
WORLD .6977
(.395)
CONSUME .4834
(.718)
NUMDEMS
NUMDEMH
SENCOMM
HOSCOMM
CONSTANT .8258
(-.224)
R-SQUARED .38699
• Significant at.10 level; **Significant at .01 level
Model 2
u.S. Loans to Sugar
Growers Against Selecte
Economic and Political
.003**
(-3.709)
.4158
(.843)
.0883*
(-1.855)
.8175
(-.236)
.6592
(.452)
.6570
(-.455)
.0004**
(-4.881)
.6670
(.441)
.0076
(3.200)
.75022
Discussion
Model 1, which contains only economic variables, explains
approximately 39% of the variance for the amount of sugar subsidy loans.
Although no independent variable proved to be statistically significant in
this particular model, it only indicates that economic forces alone do not
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detennine the level of sugar subsidy loan that is granted to sugar growers.
Model 2 explains 37% more of the variance than Modell and a total of 75%
of the variance in the level of loans allocated to sugar growers.
Despite the fact that the ratio of sugar production to total agricultural
production increased from .09 in 1965 to .12 in 1992, no significant correlation
with the level of sugar subsidy loans is reported. Likewise, domestic
consumption of sugar does not affect the level of sugar subsidy loans.
Consumption of sugar has decreased over time, beginning at 97 pounds per
capita, reaching a high of 103 pounds per capita in 1972 and 1973, and then
rapidly decreasing to 64.9 pounds per capita in 1992. The reported
significance level is .8175, strongly indicating that no correlation between
the two variables exists. One possible reason why domestic demand does
not affect the level of sugar loans lies in the U.S:s tendency to dump excess
sugar onto the world market. Canada is one of the prime markets that receives
sugar from the United States. Both the international price of sugar and the
ratio of U.S. sugar production to world sugar production are statistically
significant in this model.
Although the percent of U.S. sugar production to world production
(WORLD) or the international price of sugar (INT.$SUG) are statistically
insignificant in the first model which included only economic var~ables, the
inclusion of political variables render them statistically significant. When
the impact of one independent variable depends on the value of another
independent variable, an interaction effect exists. When testing for an
interaction effect, it was found that joint effect of SENCOMM and INT.$SUG
as well as SENCOMM andWORLD are statistically significant. One possible
explanation for the linkage between these political and economic variables
is that the senate committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry uses
economic data such as the international price of sugar, and the percent of
U.S. sugar production to world sugar production when they decide not to
support an increasing sugar loan rate. The manner in which the Senate
committee makes policy decisions is an area for more in-depth research in
the future.
Some of the results for the political variables were surprising; as the
number of Democrats who sit on the Senate Agriculture Committee and
represent sugar producing states increases, the level of sugar subsidy
decreases. Although this inverse relationship may appear surprising, the
structure of the Senate committee helps to explain their apparent lack of
support of their constituents' desire to receive sugar loans.
Senators, unlike the Representatives, serve on many committees and
represent a broad cross section of economic interests. They also enjoy a
higher level of independence in what they want to pursue politically
(Reiselbach 1994). The structure of the Senate committee demonstrates the
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medley of interests a senator is free to pursue. Unlike the House of
Representatives, the Senate does not have a committee that solely addresses
sugar. Instead, the committee addresses three very broad domestic arenas;
namely agriculture, nutrition, and forestry. Moreover, out of a possible 14
seats, only two senators from sugar producing states sat on the Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry committee in 1965. Although the number of senators
who sat on the committee increased to nineteen in 1992, those from sugar
producing states have never filled more than three seats at any given time
between 1965-1992.
The Senate committee's lack of support of sugar loans is exacerbated by
the fact that since 1971, the chair of the Senate agricultural committee was
not from a sugar producing state. Although the power of full committee
chairs declined since the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1974, their
intluence is not to be overlooked. With such a small ratio of senators from
sugar producing states who sit on the Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
committee, their ability to intluence sugar legislation could be drastically
diminished. Another potential reason is that these senators do not find it
necessary to increase the level of sugar loans because this issue is not as
significant to the future political viability. Hence, they do not make it their
priority to champion this type of legislation.
Representatives, on the other hand, more often represent specific
constituencies that may directly benefit from the loans for sugar. A
representative's tenure in Congress is only guaranteed for two years, and
often they occupy only one committee seat Their ability to bring "pork"
like sugar loans back to their constituents determines the tenure of their
career. Stigler (1974) posits that industries will actively seek regulation in
an effort to shore up cartels, restrict market entry, and avoid anti-trust
prosecution. In return, they offer political support to legislators in the form
of money, votes, and campaign activity. Sugar PACs are a classic example
of such activity, and as a recent study by the center for Public Integrity
shows, these lobby organizations have given over 2.6 million dollars to
congressional campaign committees between 1985 and 1990 (Wall Street
Journal, (1970: 26 July).
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Graph 4
PAC Money Donated to House Agriculture
Members from Sugar Producing States
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As shown in Graph 4, major sugar PACs increased their contributions to
House Agricultural members who represent sugar producing states from a
little under fifteen thousand dollars in 1974 to over eighty thousand dollars
in 1992.
As sugar PACs know, there are strong political motivations behind the
representatives who sit on the agricultural committee. Members motivated
by constituency-oriented concerns seek committees with jurisdictions salient
to their constituents (Smith, 1990). Such an orientation is not surprising
because the jurisdiction of these committees is limited. Sugar is a prime
example of a policy that affects a narrow jurisdiction of states, specifically
those in the southeastand midwest U.S. but indirectly creates widelydispersed
costs in the fonn of higher consumer prices.
Although sugar subsidy loans do not cost the taxpayer a penny, they can
still be viewed as pork because federal tax dollars are being directed to the
legislators' constituency. This phenomena however, was not evident in the
multiple regression, possibly due to the increasing power of subcommittees.
Democratization vis-a-vis 1970s Congressional refonns increasea the
subcommittee members' opportunity to participate in congressional activity
at the expense of the full committee. Since 1981, the House ofRepresentatives
formed the Cotton, Rice, and Sugar subcommittee, which quickly became
the most salient committee in Congress regarding government support of the
domestic sugar industry. 3 The long-time subcommittee chairman represents
amajor sugarproducing state (Louisiana), and roughly one halfof the thirteen
to fourteen members of the subcommittee come from sugar producing states.
Due to the limited number of years that this subcommittee has existed, it is
difficult to test its influence on the amount of sugar loans in a multiple
regression. The influence ofsuch a committee should be considered, however,
in any analysis of what impacts sugar policy making.
Graph 5
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Although Democrats have traditionally supported farm subsidies in both
chambers ofCongress, the number ofDemocmts in either the House or Senate
did not come out as slatistically significam in Model 2. This in part could be
due to the way in which democratic support was measured in the regression.
Due to the changing political almosphere ofCongress, Republicans are setting
the agenda for commiuees such as the House Agriculture commiuee. As
wimessed by Represenlative Dan Miller's seemingly brash move to not back
the sugar subsidy program although itdirectly benefits his constituency, House
and Senate Republicans are moving U.S. agriculture toward the free market
(Congressional Quanerly Almanac, 1995). Since 1977, the sugar program
has been a part of the omnibus farm bill which includes provisions for more
powerful and significant agricultural commodities such as com, wheal, and
milk. The farm bill is a prime target for Republicans because it is a
bureaucratic monolith that costs taxpayers billions, and it also ignores maIket
realities and encourages destructive fann practices (Christian ScienceMonitor,
1995).
Overall, many of the political variables which were supported with
theoretical foundations did not emerge as slatistically significant in these
models. This does not mean, however, that all political institutions tested in
this model do not directly affect the level of sugar loans; rather this reflects
upon the simplicity of the models and the complex nature of political
transactions.
Loans are not the only means of politically crafted economic support
for sugar growers. Price supports and import quolaS have also undergone
sweeping changes since 1965 when the U.S. began to cultivate domestic
production as its major source ofsugar. From 1965 to 1974, Congress devised
artificial price supports for sugar on the basis of its world market price. Yet,
in 1974, Congress allowed the 40 year old sugar price support program to
cease to exist due to heavy consumer pressures on Congress and partly to
lobby overkill by domestic and foreign producers (Congressional Quarterly
Almanac, 1974)
u.s. lind WOIld Prlc& ofSugar
19116-1992
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Graph 5 shows how the domestic price support system began to outpace
the international price of sugar at an increasing rate between 1965 and 1992.
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The price support system capped out at 26 cents a pound in 1991
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1991). The international price, however,
bottomed out at 4 cents a pound in 1985 and did not recover substantially
from this decrease. By restricting U.S. consumer and sugar user purchases
of world market sugar, the U.S. sugar program reduced the demand and
diverted the supply on the world market, thereby helping to depress world
market sugar prices (Congressional Budget Office, 1987). Third world
countries, as mentioned earlier, are devastated by the U.S.'s economic
manipulation of the world sugar market.
In order to understand what are some of the political forces behind the
level of domestic price support over time, a bivariate correlation was employed
using the amount of sugar PAC monet contributed to House Agricultural
members who represent sugar producing states and the price differential
between domestic price supports and the world market price of sugar. The
results of the correlation are a coefficient of 2.749 and a significance level of
.0423, suggesting that there is a direct link between rising price supports and
the increased amount of contributions sugar PACs give to House agriculture
members.
Import Quotas are often utilized as a political means to stimulate or
repress foreign sugar industries. The U.S. imposes trade embargoes on
countries with controversial political systems such as Cuba, and also gives
some foreign countries first priority in fUlfilling the small niche of imported
sugar that they allow to pass through their borders. Sugar import quotas fall
at some point under the jurisdiction of the House Agriculture Committee
and the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee. A bivariate
correlation between senators from sugar producing states who sit on the
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee and the level of import quotas
yields a significance level of .011 and a coefficient of -.2515. This suggests
that as the number of senators from sugar producing states who sit on these
salient committees increases over time, the amount of imported sugar that is
allowed to pass through the U.S. decreases. Such findings would support the
policy of protectionism which the U.S. has maintained regarding their sugar
industry.
U.S. law mandates that the U.S. import at least 1.25 million tons of
sugar a year in order to meet trade obligations and ensure that foreign suppliers
receive a share of the domestic market. When the domestic sugar market is
not in danger of drought, the U.S. currently does not import much more than
1.25 million tons (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1995).
As price supports and loan rates face extinction under the Republican
chopping block, lawmakers are still wrangling over setting the import tonnage
level at a level where sugar growers would still be able to forfeit sugar to the
government for a guaranteed price (Congressional QuarterlyAlmanac, 1995).
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Without a price floor, sugar growers would have to compete against world
markets and would not benefit from a quota system.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
Both economic and political forces, as the analysis shows, directly affect
the U.S. sugar subsidy program. Although the data regarding sugar loans
did not show many statistically significant correlations with political
institutions, the political variables included in Model 2 explained about 50%
of the total variance of loans, lending support to North's theory that political
institutions autonomously affect policy outcome. As the structure of many
political institutions changes, so does the support of the sugar subsidy. With
a higher number of Republicans controlling the salient agriculture committees
and committing themselves towards the party line which prioritizes the budget
bill over constituency interests, the process of the political exchange was at
times different than expected. Nevertlleless, sugar loans, price supports, and
import quotas are all manipulated by political actors.
The rate at which domestic price supports increased over the world price
of sugar is a revealing example of how inefficient tile sugar industry operates.
Basic supply and demand theory is set aside for the pursuit of political ends
as witnessed by how PAC money plays a role in defining the economic
outcome of sugar policy.
Import Quotas act as a weighty political tool for the U.S. to wield when
it wants to affect the economic viability of a foreign country. Perhaps a more
economically efficient approach towards the U.S. sugar subsidy program is
to create a more uniform and comprehensive policy that brings domestic
policy into line with U.S. international trade policy (Monahan, 1992).
A gradual reduction in the loan rate will bring the differential between
U.S. sugar prices in line with world prices (Graph 4). This will naturally
spur inefficient producers to drop out of the domestic market, allowing foreign
sugar industries to revitalize and capture some of the lost market share in
both the world and U.S. sugar market.
By splitting the sugar program into three different sectors, it is difficult
to modify one without affecting another; consequently, as the Republicans
shift agricultural policy towards a free market, all aspects of the sugar policy
will be affected. The political repercussions of this shift in desired policy
outcome, however, is yet to be observed. This sugar subsidy program deserves
continued attention in the spring as the both the budget bill and omnibus
farm bill are put into action and the politicians campaign for constituency
support in the next election.
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infonnation through human interaction. Due to the subtle and complex nature
of quantifying infonnal constraints, this paper will empirically address only
fonnal constraints.
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